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Cap and trade has become the mechanism of choice for many American lawmakers seeking to address the global issue of climate change.1 The recent adoption of 
the California cap and trade system has further spurred present 
discussions on whether a domestic cap and trade system to regu-
late greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions would be most effective 
in mitigating climate change.2 Moreover, the Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) program currently implemented 
in the Northeastern states further contributes to this debate.3 
Despite its regulatory nature, major business associations and 
environmental groups have endorsed market-based cap and 
trade, and the proposed system has enjoyed more political trac-
tion than other possible GHG regulations, such as a carbon tax.4
The idea of cap and trade is simple enough: set a “cap” that 
equals the annual allowable emissions of the targeted pollutant; 
allocate, either by auction or by free distribution, a certain number 
of allowances to pollute, which should cumulatively fulfill the 
cap; and allow the selling and purchasing (i.e., trade) of these 
allowances between firms.5 Many cap and trade programs also 
include offset provisions that allow firms to purchase additional 
allowances from the regulator by investing in additional pollution 
reducing programs.6
Theoretically, this system would create an efficient and 
low-maintenance administrative scheme to reduce GHGs. Under 
a cap and trade program, the regulated firms could use their own 
industry knowledge and expertise to decide the most sensible 
method of reduction. Additionally, firms could also cover emis-
sions beyond their allocated amounts by purchasing allowances 
from other firms.7 If Firm A can reduce GHG emissions cheaply, 
it can sell its allowances to Firm B, which may not be able to 
reduce its emissions at such a low cost. Therefore, the aggregate 
reduction goal of cap and trade is achieved at the lowest cost 
because the most efficient polluters, like Firm A, bear the lion’s 
share of responsibility to meet the emissions cap.8 As the cap 
is periodically lowered, successful price signals would likely 
be able to spur on the continuous reduction of emissions at the 
lowest cost through trading and technological innovations.9 
A well-designed cap and trade program will not only bring 
economic efficiency, but increased administrative expeditious-
ness as well—the government would play a more passive facili-
tator role: set the cap, auction off allowances, monitor the use 
of those allowances, facilitate the purchase of offsets, verify 
the facilities’ emissions levels, and enforce against firms who 
exceed their allowed emissions levels.10
Policymakers, academics, and economists have touted GHG 
reduction and cap and trade as the perfect marriage because 
GHGs have the same effect on climate change no matter where 
the emissions occur; a unit of emissions in California will affect 
the globe the same amount as a unit of emissions in New York.11 
Greenhouse gases also do not have localized effects like sulfur 
dioxide or lead, so one California firm can use a large amount 
of allowances without disproportionately jeopardizing the health 
and welfare of its neighboring residents.12
Although GHGs generally have global effects, the co- 
pollutants that often accompany them can cause severe health 
and environmental problems in the local communities where 
emissions are often highest.13 Typical co-pollutants include 
volatile organic compounds (“VOCs”), sulfur dioxide, benzene, 
carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxide, and other harmful particulate 
matter.14 Since firms located in low-income minority communi-
ties tend to have the most antiquated facilities that emit the highest 
amount of GHGs, these companies would probably be the ones 
that would need to purchase the most allowances through cap and 
trade to meet their limited allocations.15 Although cap and trade 
aims to provide facilities with flexibility to decide for themselves 
when to reduce emissions or use allowances, this runs against 
environmental justice goals of promoting public participation, 
distributive justice, and community empowerment.16 To attain 
economic efficiency and to maintain a broad holistic solution, 
cap and trade programs and proposals, as we know them, do not 
factor in distributional consequences in any meaningful way.17 If 
cap and trade goes according to plan, streamlined trading would 
run like a thoroughbred, liquidity would increase, and all these 
decisions that affect human health and the environment would 
effectively occur without input from the people who are affected 
locally. Additionally, many of the enacted and proposed GHG 
regulations have focused on preventing and mitigating harm, 
but have not devoted the same attention and care in providing 
improvements to the condition of the people’s lives.
This article holds that environmental justice and cap and 
trade can actually be harmonized, arguing for a more robust and 
nuanced cap and trade system that promotes principles of public 
participation, equity, and empowerment, while still maintaining 
an optimal and efficient market-based system. In fact, a cap 
and trade program could even be used to spur on environmental 
*This article is a shortened and revised version that is based on a longer and 
expanded article in the Chicago-Kent Journal of Environmental and Energy 
Law, entitled Spurring on Environmental Justice Through Cap and Trade.
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justice. To achieve this end, such a system must involve: (1) an 
identification process,18 (2) investment into environmental jus-
tice communities,19 and (3) financial mechanisms to fund such 
investment.20
The first step in implementing a cap and trade program 
that enhances environmental justice is to define “environmental 
justice” itself and identify where environmental justice com-
munities are located. Environmental justice communities are 
generally defined as those composed predominantly of persons 
of color or a substantial proportion of persons below the pov-
erty line that are also subjected to a disproportionate burden 
of environmental hazards relative to other communities.21 
Proper identification of these communities is important because 
one cannot hope to aid the environmental justice movement if 
one does not know who or what comprises an environmental 
justice community.
The second step of implementation calls for the investment 
of revenue generated by cap and trade back into those communi-
ties that are most affected by environmental pollution and health 
problems. This article adopts the proposal of the California 
Market Advisory Committee to devote “a significant portion 
of the allowance value to investments in communities that bear 
disproportionate environmental and public health burdens.”22 
Under this proposal, the revenue gathered through cap and trade 
would be placed into the hands of the affected community to 
invest in clean energy and technology projects that could benefit 
the community’s environmental health and economic condition.
The third step calls for financial mechanisms to allow the 
cap and trade program to gather the revenue needed to facili-
tate the second step. These financial mechanisms would likely 
take the form of allowance auctions, luxury taxes, and possibly 
monetary penalties for excess emissions.23
advancIng envIronmenTaL JusTIce  
Through cap and Trade
identifying enviRonmental JustiCe Communities
The first fundamental step in incorporating environmental 
justice in a national GHG cap and trade program is to identify 
the communities who are most-at-risk to environmental harms 
and are hindered in being able to reduce their exposure to these 
harms. Although it may sometimes be clear which communi-
ties are most negatively affected by environmental pollution, 
a formal database would serve an important role to officially 
recognize the environmental justice communities. By identify-
ing these environmental justice communities, policymakers and 
government regulators would have a database from which to 
administer benefits to the communities more effectively.
Other government entities, such as the California Air 
Resources Board (“CARB”), which includes the Environmental 
Justice Advisory Committee (hereinafter “EJAC”), have 
proposed similar programs called the “screening method.”24 
Members of EJAC have advocated for such a screening method 
to determine which areas qualify as environmental justice 
communities.25
pRoCess of identifiCation
Environmental justice communities can be identified or 
“screened” in two ways. First, a certain neighborhood can attempt 
to self-identify as an environmental justice community by apply-
ing with the regulatory agency. Such an evaluation of applicants 
could use EJAC’s August 25, 2010 screening method recommenda-
tions to CARB as a model for the criteria to use when identifying 
environmental justice communities.26 Specifically, EJAC has rec-
ommended that “[a]t the very least we expect the [CARB] to 
include race ethnicity, home ownership, age of housing stock, 
language isolations, age[,] and access to health services” when 
screening for potential environmental justice communities.27 
This recommendation is based on EJAC’s research, which found 
that, in the San Francisco Bay, income, race ethnicity, home 
ownership, language isolation, and land use have been “shown 
to be statistically significant indicators of increased cancer risk 
or respiratory hazards [].”28 This Bay Area study demonstrates 
that the effects of environmental injustice correlates with low-
income and minority communities.29 EJAC further recommends 
that the criteria take into account cumulative effects, tailoring 
certain criteria for certain types of regions (e.g., measuring 
pesticide use in farm areas), and conducting analysis on land 
use including the proximity of emitting facilities to residential 
neighborhoods.30 The self-identification process would also 
allow environmental justice communities to voice their concerns 
and needs. By allowing environmental justice communities to 
publicly participate in the identification process, the government 
is legitimizing and validating the communities’ concerns and 
problems. This would promote one of the environmental justice’s 
main goals of furthering public participation.
Second, in conjunction with self-identification, regulators 
could also actively seek out and identify potential environmental 
justice communities on their own. In fact, regulators should 
have ultimate responsibility to identify and evaluate potential 
environmental justice communities. Even if that process requires 
fewer government resources, regulators cannot simply rely on 
the environmental justice communities to self-identify. Instead, 
the government must proactively pinpoint environmental justice 
communities based off a set of specified criteria. Government 
decision-makers and regulators could choose to partner with 
nonprofit groups or contract with commercial survey companies 
to identify those underprivileged communities that are at high 
risk of environmental and public health harms. While it would 
likely be a difficult task to index every eligible community 
in America, once such a list is created in toto, government 
regulators would then theoretically have a comprehensive list of 
communities to work from. Through this identification process, 
specific information about each community would accordingly 
be gathered, creating an encyclopedic database containing 
profiles of all environmental justice communities. Such a data-
base would afford the government the ability to understand and 
meet the needs of individual communities in the most tailored 
and direct way.
However, problems could arise if a self-identified community 
that desires recognition as an environmental justice 
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community is rejected by or omitted from the designation process 
by the government. This could present an even bigger issue if the 
coveted benefits and resources that designation affords environ-
mental justice communities are significant.
While this article cannot specifically address every situation, 
it suggests two possible solutions to ensure that an environmental 
justice communities database covers all deserving communities. 
First, the government should establish broad and flexible criteria 
that consider a wide range of environmental problems in various 
environmental justice communities. 31 Second, the government 
could implement an appeals process whereby an applicant-
community that is denied designation can make its case to an 
appeals board. This appeals process would allow for a more 
detailed review to determine whether a community satisfies 
the established criteria vis-à-vis a meeting and reconsideration 
of any special circumstances that the community in question 
may have.
gReateR oveRsight foR fiRms in enviRonmental 
JustiCe Communities
After designating the environmental justice communities, 
government regulators should maintain close monitoring of the 
firms in these communities to ensure compliance with regula-
tions and firms’ purchase of allowances sufficient to match their 
emissions. These government regulators may also want to 
promote more public participation by implementing a public 
accountability process where private citizens can call and report 
any suspicious or illegal activity by a firm. Thus, while firms 
operating in designated environmental justice communities 
would not be subject to more stringent cap and trade regula-
tions, they would be under more vigilant government and public 
monitoring compared to firms outside of environmental justice 
communities.
Funding for this oversight could come from various sources. 
First, these funds could come from the government enforcement 
budget already in place.32 An enforcement agency could choose 
to focus more of its resources on environmental justice enforce-
ment because the cost should theoretically be lower under a cap 
and trade regime. Second, funding could be raised if a portion 
of the revenue gained through the cap and trade program’s 
allowance auctions is specifically set aside for enforcement and 
monitoring efforts in environmental justice communities. In this 
way, the companies buying allowances would supplement the 
cost of enforcement.
investment in loCal enviRonmental JustiCe 
Communities
In furthering the environmental justice goal of community 
empowerment, a cap and trade program can provide funding for 
localized investments in clean energy and technology projects 
that could revitalize communities surrounding the projects. By 
investing the capital raised by market-based programs, such as 
the auctioning of allowances, in these local areas, cap and trade 
programs could stimulate economic growth in environmental 
justice communities.
In recent years, much emphasis has been placed on the 
potential economic benefits associated with green develop-
ment and “green-collared” jobs.33 Political leaders, government 
policymakers, academics, nonprofit groups, economists, urban 
planners, labor unions, and businesses have all taken interest 
in fostering economic growth in conjunction with sustainable 
communities, clean energy technology, and improving the 
overall quality of life for the local residents.34 The use of a 
GHG cap and trade program can support and combine two 
major environmental policy goals. The first major goal is to 
shift America’s fossil fuel based economy towards an economy 
that “can function effectively through renewable energy sources 
and [] achiev[e] high levels of energy efficiency.”35 The second 
major goal is to encourage the broad principles of environmental 
justice by promoting environmental health improvement 
and empowering the local environmental justice communities.
Combining these two goals could bring about significant 
reductions in GHG emissions while also creating environmental 
and economic improvements in impoverished environmental 
justice communities. Thus, by striving for the first goal to envi-
ronmental justice communities, policymakers can fulfill the 
second goal as well. When a plethora of the clean technology 
and clean energy investments and projects are funneled into 
environmental justice communities, green-collar jobs would 
be created to satisfy the need for individuals to manufacture 
and provide pertinent goods and services.36 Van Jones, a lead-
ing expert in the area of green technology, wrote, “[w]e should 
use the transition to a better energy strategy as an opportunity 
to create a better economy,” and revitalize communities by, 
“creat[ing] new markets, new technology, new industries, and a 
new workforce”37 based on a corresponding need for thousands 
of contracts and workers.38
investing in Clean eneRgy and teChnology
Investing in the development of renewable and clean energy 
infrastructure and technology (hereinafter, “clean energy”) 
in local communities would lead to greater prospects for job 
creation and economic advancement. According to a report by 
the Renewable and Appropriate Energy Laboratory, “[a]cross a 
broad range of scenarios, the renewable energy sector generates 
more jobs than the fossil fuel-based energy sector per unit of 
energy delivered (i.e., per average megawatt).”39 U.S. Commerce 
Department research has also shown that 16.7 jobs are created 
for every $1 million spent on clean energy investments, com-
pared to the 5.3 jobs created through $1 million in spending on 
oil, natural gas, or coal investments.40 “Clean energy invest-
ments” could include spending for building retrofits, public 
transportation, smart grid electrical transmission systems, solar 
power, wind power, and biomass fuels.41
The creation of jobs—green or otherwise—occur from 
the direct, indirect, and induced effects of spending.42 To 
borrow from an example given in a report by the Department 
of Economics and Political Economy Research Institute 
at University of Massachusetts, Amherst, significant jobs are 
created when resources are invested into the business of 
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retrofitting homes.43 This first causes the direct effect creation 
of jobs for workers who could be retrofitting the homes.44 But 
also, indirect job creation comes from the jobs associated with 
those industries that supply intermediate goods for the build-
ing of retrofits such as lumber, steel, and conveyances. Further, 
induced job creation would result when these workers spend 
their incomes on other goods and services, further increasing 
overall employment capacity.45
These clean energy jobs, because of their characteristics 
and demands, are often well-suited to local residents in envi-
ronmental justice communities. Clean energy jobs require 
traditional blue-collar workers; as Dr. Raquel Pinderhughes, a 
San Francisco State University urban planning and development 
professor, wrote that “[g]reen collar jobs are blue color jobs 
in green businesses- that is, manual labor jobs.”46 At the same 
time, the University of Massachusetts, Amherst has reported 
that clean energy spending produces more jobs at all pay levels 
than the fossil fuel industry does, further expanding the capacity 
for employment at all skill levels.47 Because clean energy jobs 
require more workers at every skill level, more opportunities 
are created for those without a college degree. According to an 
IMPLAN 2008 Current Population Survey, one million dollars 
of clean energy investments creates 8.0 jobs for workers with 
a high school diploma or less, while a fossil fuel expenditure 
of the same amount creates only 2.2 jobs of the same type.48 
And one million dollars of clean energy investments creates 4.8 
jobs for workers with a high school diploma or less paying on 
average $15/hour, which is over six times greater than the fossil 
fuel industry’s 0.7 jobs.49
Furthermore, many of these clean energy investments 
tend to rely more on domestic goods, services, and labor than 
their fossil fuel counterparts.50 For example, according to the 
report by the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, about 
ninety-seven percent of total spending in public transportation 
and building retrofits would most likely remain in the U.S. 
economy.51 Instead of outsourcing labor or importing goods and 
services, these investments’ applications are concentrated within 
the United States.52 In fact, these jobs would also benefit the 
localized communities in which they are located because many 
of them cannot be outsourced.53 For example, a home can only 
be retrofitted where it is located and the retrofitting of a public 
transportation system cannot plausibly be done overseas.54 The 
data above demonstrates that the clean energy sector offers a 
greater quantity of jobs without sacrificing quality and pay.55 
Ultimately, these jobs can empower and revitalize the local com-
munities both economically and environmentally because they 
are “high quality, living wage manual labor jobs that engage 
[community members] in meaningful, environmentally restor-
ative, community serving work and livelihoods.”56
empoweRment of enviRonmental JustiCe 
Communities thRough Clean eneRgy
Environmental justice communities can harness the wealth 
of potential benefits that comes from clean energy investments.57 
As the federal government has done in the past with programs 
such as the U.S. Department of Energy’s Weatherization 
Assistance Program, the government could also marshal finan-
cial resources to each environmental justice community for the 
purpose of making clean energy investments.58 These financial 
resources would not come from additional taxpayer dollars, but 
from the revenue gained through the cap and trade program’s 
various financial mechanisms. The federal government should 
play this subsidiary role to facilitate the local empowerment of 
these communities.
FInancIaL mechanIsms In cap and Trade
The financial resources that could facilitate investments into 
rehabilitating environmental justice communities mentioned in 
the previous section would come primarily from a few financial 
mechanisms within the cap and trade program. The following 
financial mechanisms can be implemented into the cap and trade 
program to generate more revenue for clean energy investments 
in environmental justice communities.
auCtioning allowanCes
An auction system should follow the California Market 
Advisory Committee’s recommendation to initially allocate 
a portion of allowances for free. Additionally, the government 
should hold an annual auction for a portion of the allowances.59 
As noted by the California Market Advisory Committee, it is pos-
sible to use “the allowance value to finance reductions of GHGs 
and criteria pollutants in communities that bear disproportionate 
environmental and public-health burdens.”60 The percentage of 
allowances auctioned should then increase over time.61
Under an effective system, firms would purchase the allow-
ances based on how many units of emissions they plan to emit. 
The government should also set a baseline bid price to ensure 
that each allowance is sold for a minimum amount. It is critical 
for the government to ensure that there is an adequate demand 
for these allowances, so the government must also set an overall 
cap that is low enough to prevent an oversaturation of allow-
ances on the market.62 The auctioning of allowances would not 
likely generate adequate revenue if the firms do not otherwise 
constantly and consistently need allowances to meet their level 
of emissions. In addition to auctioning allowances to firms, the 
government could also open up the auction to the general public. 
Private citizens or groups in the general public can purchase 
allowances and effectively retire them by never using them, thus 
helping to decrease supply and create a greater demand that 
would drive up the price of allowances generally.
It is important to point out that there is no historical prec-
edent for the auctioning off of all allowances; usually, at least a 
portion of the allowances are distributed freely to firms.63 There 
is a concern such a large auction of allowances to so many regu-
lated entities could prove unwieldy.64 However, the government 
is not completely unfamiliar with other types of auctions on such 
a large scale. For example, the U.S. government has performed 
and managed treasury auctions before, which can be just as 
complex and large.65 Of all the organizations and entities in 
the country, the federal government has the most resources, 
knowledge, and experience to run a GHG emissions allowances 
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auction.66 Several state and federal carbon trading programs 
have already begun implementing allowance auctions.67 For 
example, in North America the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (“RGGI”) has been in place since 2009 and has allowed 
all RGGI states to auction a majority of their allowances and 
establishes a reserve price for those auctioned shares.68
luxuRy tax
The government should also consider implementing a 
luxury tax into its cap and trade program to incentivize firms 
to keep their emissions levels within a reasonable amount. The 
luxury tax should work as follows: first, the government would 
designate a percentage of overall emissions as the threshold 
where, if a firm were to emit an amount exceeding that percent-
age, it would have to pay a heavier tax—the luxury tax—for 
every ton of emissions over this threshold. For example, the 
government could set a luxury cap as 0.5% of the total emissions 
within the cap and trade system. Under this proposal, if Firm 
A’s amount of emissions comprises 0.6% of the total emissions, 
it would have to pay a hefty tax in accordance with those emis-
sions above the luxury cap.
One scholar, Professor Kaswan of the University of San 
Francisco School Of Law, has proposed a similar approach. This 
cap and trade approach would treat certain environmental justice 
geographic areas differently by placing limits on the “percent-
age of allowances permitted from outside the program area [i.e., 
the markets’ geographic region], and a greater than 1:1 ratio [of 
allowances to emissions] could be required” and mandate even 
more allowance purchasing.69 Though this is not exactly the 
same as a luxury tax, Professor Kaswan’s proposal could dis-
incentivize the use of allowances by making them less valuable 
in certain geographic areas. In this way, the proposal conflicts 
with the market-based values of a cap and trade system.
The luxury cap should be carefully calculated so that firms 
are not discouraged from trade amongst themselves, which 
would disrupt the efficiency and effectiveness of the cap and 
trading program.70 At the same time, the luxury cap should not 
be so high that firms ignore its existence. In setting a luxury tax, 
government regulators must strike a balance to maintain dis-
tributive justice in pollution trading and ensure that the market 
is not significantly disrupted. To accomplish this, the govern-
ment should hire economists, research groups, and surveyors to 
formulate an appropriate tax.
The luxury tax serves to reconcile two competing prin-
ciples that arise within the cap and trade program. The first is 
distributive justice: poor communities should not have to suffer 
a disproportionate amount of pollution and bear the majority 
of the nation’s emissions.71 The other is marketplace morality: 
firms are guided more by price signals and cheaper reductions 
than by concern for the localized effects of concentrated pollut-
ants.72 Though it is important to incentivize firms to participate 
in the cap and trade program and reduce their GHG emissions 
efficiently and cheaply, this program must also ensure that the 
emissions levels in environmental justice communities do not 
reach unreasonable—or unjust—levels. A luxury tax would 
incentivize firms to make good faith attempts to reduce their 
own emissions instead of merely relying on allowances.
monetaRy penalties
This article also proposes the investment of a portion of 
revenues gained from monetary penalties that firms pay for 
excess emissions, into clean energy investments in environmen-
tal justice communities. There have already been proposals by 
the California Market Advisory Committee to “use a portion of 
the allowance value…to finance pollution reductions in commu-
nities that bear disproportionate environmental and public-health 
burdens . . . .”73 Using a portion of collected monetary penalties 
to invest in burdened communities’ clean energy projects could 
further encourage environmental justice through cap and trade.
concLusIon
At first blush, it may seem implausible for a market-based 
cap and trade program to harmonize with—let alone encour-
age—environmental justice. But implementing a cap and trade 
system that allows for localized clean energy investments could 
do just that. Identifying environmental justice communities, 
promoting public participation, and increasing oversight and 
compliance in a new cap and trade system are the steps needed 
to achieve this goal. Further, clean energy investments in 
overburdened communities, and the subsequent economic and 
employment benefits, could serve as the vehicle needed to har-
monize these twin aims. Implementation of an effective cap and 
trade system can not only curb greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate change, but can improve the environmental health and 
economic condition of local communities across America.
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